Why the card is a weaker link than the protocol
Moving from Wiegand to OSDP alone does not secure the card. If the card is 125 kHz or another unprotected technology, it can be cloned in front of the reader, and a reader with an encrypted link to the controller will accept the copy as the original. Secure Channel protects the wire between the reader and the controller, not the card itself.
For management this means that spending on new OSDP readers does not close the cloning risk as long as the cards remain unprotected. This should be stated clearly when the budget is approved, because a newer protocol is often bought while the old cards are kept.
How to estimate the expected loss
A simple model has three quantities: the value of the resources that the card gives access to, the annual probability of an incident involving a cloned card, and the share of that value that is actually lost. Their product gives the expected annual loss. Each quantity is an assumption, so the calculation only makes sense if the assumptions are written down and can be challenged.
The value of the resources includes not only theft of goods but also downtime after an unauthorised entry, the cost of an audit after the incident and reporting obligations. The amounts are taken from the company's own accounts and insurance, not from general tables.
One-off cost vs expected annual loss (PLN)
Cost of replacing the card technology
On the cost side we have cards in a technology with authentication and readers that can read them. These are one-off items, spread over several years of use. If the readers are being replaced during the migration to OSDP anyway, the additional cost of choosing multi-technology readers is usually small compared with buying twice.
The calculation below assumes 400 cards and 20 readers. These are sample assumptions: in the plant the numbers are taken from the card register and the door inventory.
Comparison: when the replacement pays back
In the example the expected annual loss is PLN 10,000 and the replacement cost is PLN 26,800. The simple payback period is about 2.7 years. If the resources behind the doors are more valuable or the probability of an incident is higher, the payback is shorter; if they are lower, the replacement can be spread over stages, starting with the doors of highest importance.
The payback period is only one measure. Management often accepts a replacement for other reasons: auditor requirements, the group security policy or the expectations of the plant's own customers.
What the calculation does not show
The calculation does not price reputational damage or the consequences of an incident in a zone with hazardous substances, where a single unauthorised entry can have different consequences. For such doors the card replacement is a decision that is independent of the payback period.
Transmission encryption also depends on the protection of keys: with weak key management the system stays exposed even after the cards are replaced. Replacing the cards and tidying up key management are two separate tasks.
The role of InnerWeb
InnerWeb does not produce readers and does not supply access control cards. It integrates with the plant's access control system: it links swipe events with qualifications, permits and attendance. A change of card technology on the access control side therefore does not change the integration, as long as the access control system keeps sending events.
Sample calculation: cloning risk vs replacement
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Value of resources behind the doors | 500,000 PLN |
| Probability of an incident | 2 % per year |
| DESFire cards | 400 x 12 PLN |
| Multi-technology readers | 20 x 1,100 PLN |
Result: Expected loss PLN 10,000 per year; replacement cost 4,800 + 22,000 = PLN 26,800; payback about 2.7 years.
Note: Sample calculation. Replace the assumptions with the plant's data; prices are indicative ranges from 2025-2026 deployments, each quotation is priced individually.
Video
Frequently asked questions
Can a 125 kHz card be copied without specialist knowledge?
If the card is unprotected, it can be cloned in front of the reader. We omit the technical details, but the risk is known and described in public sources about OSDP.
Does the new OSDP protocol solve the cloning problem?
No. Secure Channel protects the reader-to-controller link, and a cloned card will still be read correctly.
Where should the probability of an incident come from?
From the company's own history of events, risk assessment and discussion with security. It is an assumption, so it is worth calculating a low and a high variant.
Do all the cards have to be replaced at once?
No. You can start with the doors of highest importance and issue new cards in stages.
Sources
Let's talk about integrating with your access control system
We will describe which events from the InnerWeb access control system can be received and how to connect them with permits, attendance and working time recording. We will propose a demonstration on your data.
Let's talk