Step 1: encrypted mode instead of installation mode
OSDP in installation mode sends data in plain text, and encryption requires an explicit enabling and key exchange in the reader and the controller. The first action for the administrator is therefore to check which mode each reader works in. A reader that was left in the initial mode after installation does not differ from Wiegand in terms of confidentiality.
Secure Channel encryption uses AES-128. The evidence for the audit is a dump or report from the controller showing the channel status for each reader address, with a date.
Step 2: reader supervision and response
The OSDP controller supervises the reader status continuously, which makes it possible to detect disconnection or sabotage. With Wiegand, removing or destroying a reader without additional wiring raises no alarm. Enabling supervision only makes sense if the event reaches someone who responds.
Define the owner of the tamper event, the response time and the way it is confirmed. Once a quarter, check that the alarm really arrives, for example by a controlled disconnection of one reader within an agreed window.
Layers of reader protection (number of control steps)
Step 3: physical protection of the housing and the link
Encryption does not help if someone replaces the reader with their own or connects a device in a junction box. A seal on the housing, screws secured against unscrewing and routing the cable inside the wall reduce this scenario. Readers in places without supervision, for example at the gate, need extra attention.
Record in the register which readers have seals and when they were last inspected. A broken seal combined with working supervision gives two signals instead of one.
Step 4: keys, the weak point of encryption
Encryption protects transmission, but security also depends on the protection of keys; with weak key management the system stays exposed. The minimum is: a key different from the manufacturer's default, a limited group of people who know it, a record of the exchange in the register and a key change after the administrator leaves.
We describe the detailed rotation practice in a material on reader key management; here one thing matters: the key is treated like the administrator password of the system.
Step 5: a card that cannot be copied
Moving from Wiegand to OSDP alone does not secure the card: if the card is 125 kHz or another unprotected technology, it can be cloned in front of the reader. Full protection therefore also requires replacing the card technology with one that uses authentication.
If the budget does not allow replacing everything at once, start with the doors leading to the zones of highest importance, and cover the remaining ones in the next stage.
Audit evidence and the place of InnerWeb
The auditor expects four documents: a list of readers with their operating mode, a report from the supervision test, the key register and the card policy. InnerWeb does not produce readers and integrates with the access control system; it links swipe events with permits and attendance, so it provides evidence on the use of cards, not on the protection of the reader.
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Frequently asked questions
Is it enough to change Wiegand to OSDP?
No. You also have to enable Secure Channel, set up supervision, look after the keys and housings, and secure the card.
How do I check that encryption works?
A report from the controller showing the secure channel status for each reader address, with a date.
What about 125 kHz cards?
They can be cloned in front of the reader, so protection requires replacing the card technology.
Does InnerWeb protect the readers?
No. InnerWeb integrates with the access control system and links swipe events with permits and attendance.
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Let's talk about integrating with your access control system
We will describe which events from the InnerWeb access control system can be received and how to connect them with permits, attendance and working time recording. We will propose a demonstration on your data.
Let's talk