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Best practices for managing access control reader keys

OSDP encryption is only as strong as the protection of its keys. In many plants nobody knows who loaded the key into the readers or where it is stored. The practices below divide roles between security and IT, describe the key lifecycle and set out what to do when a reader is replaced or an installer leaves.

AES-128
encryption in OSDP Secure Channel
3
separate registers: link keys, card keys, issued cards
Source: practical recommendation

Why keys are the weak link

Encryption protects the transmission, but security also depends on how the keys are protected; with weak key management the system stays exposed. OSDP Secure Channel encrypts the reader-to-controller communication with AES-128, so the mathematics is usually not the problem. The problem is who knows the key and for how long.

A typical situation: the installer loads the key during fitting, writes it down in a private notebook and leaves the integrator's company. The plant has no copy, does not know whether the key was shared by all readers, and cannot replace it safely without a visit to every door.

Practice 1: divide the roles between security and IT

Appoint one owner of the key process, usually in IT or security, and a deputy. The owner approves the generation, loading and replacement of keys. The installer performs the technical task but is not the owner of the key.

Security is responsible for physical access to readers and controllers, IT for where the key is stored and for access control to it. Separating the roles limits the risk that one person has both physical access to a reader and knowledge of the key.

Distribution of responsibility for keys (example)

Distribution of responsibility for keys (example)Horizontal bar chart: process owner 3 tasks, IT 3, security 2, installer 1.0123number of tasksProcess ownerProcess owner: 3 number of tasks3ITIT: 3 number of tasks3SecuritySecurity: 2 number of tasks2InstallerInstaller: 1 number of tasks1
Source: Conceptual illustration of a sample split of tasks in the key management process

Practice 2: the key register and its contents

Keep a register that does not contain the keys themselves, but their metadata: the identifier of the reader group, the date of loading, the approving person, the executing person and the planned date of replacement. Store the key itself in a place with controlled access, with a record of who read it and when.

The register is also audit evidence. It shows that the plant knows which readers work in Secure Channel and which in installation mode, in which data is sent in clear text.

  • identifier of the reader group and locations
  • date of loading and date of the planned key replacement
  • approving person and executing person
  • operating mode: Secure Channel or installation mode
  • place where the key is stored and the list of people with access

Practice 3: reader replacement and installer departure

When a reader is replaced, the new reader receives the key in a mode approved by the owner of the process, and the old reader goes to scrapping or has its configuration cleared. A dismantled reader with a stored key is a device that could reveal the group key.

When an installer leaves or the integrator changes, treat the keys they had access to as potentially disclosed. Replacement of the reader group key is then planned for the nearest service window, and in the meantime supervision of events with unusual punches increases.

The contract with the integrator should include a clause on handing the keys over to the plant and a ban on keeping copies outside the agreed place.

Practice 4: keys for the link and keys for the cards, separately

Moving from Wiegand to OSDP alone does not secure the card: if the card is 125 kHz or another unprotected technology, it can be cloned in front of the reader. Managing the keys of the link does not replace managing the cards, and in a plant with encrypted cards a third level appears: the keys of the card itself.

Maintain three registers: link keys, card keys and issued cards. Different lifecycles require different owners and different procedures.

Impact on the integration with InnerWeb

InnerWeb does not produce or replace readers and does not store reader keys. It receives punch events from the KD system, so replacing the key in a reader does not change the integration, as long as the KD system keeps sending events.

After a key replacement, check the continuity of the punch stream in the log: lack of events from a reader after the change signals that the controller has not established an encrypted session.

Checklist

Video

Frequently asked questions

Who should know the reader key?

The process owner and a narrow group of authorised people, with a record of access. The installer performs the task but should not keep the key after the work is finished.

What to do when an installer has left the integrator's company?

Treat the keys they had access to as potentially disclosed and plan the replacement of the reader group key in the nearest service window.

Does InnerWeb store reader keys?

No. InnerWeb receives punch events from the KD system and does not handle the reader-to-controller link.

Sources

Want to put your keys in order?

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