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125 kHz Card Cloning: A Case from a Production Plant

The security team of a production plant sees on gate footage that two people walked in after a single badge swipe, while the log shows only one employee. The gate readers handle 125 kHz only, so the first hypothesis is a copied card. This article walks through the reasoning the team followed and the evidence leadership needs. It is a concept based on publicly described technology, not a report from a specific client.

0 bit
authentication of a 125 kHz card number
Source: public descriptions of EM4100
128 bit
AES key in DESFire EV3

The situation: two people, one swipe

The production plant has a gate with readers for employee cards. After a report from a shift supervisor, the head of security reviews the footage and sees that two people entered during the night shift, while the log holds one swipe. The second person has no entry in the attendance system, wears work clothes and moves through the hall without an escort.

The first question is whether this was a simple case of following a colleague through the gate or whether someone used a copied card. The answer changes the scale of the incident. Following a colleague is a rule violation. A copied card is a technical gap that affects every card of this type in the plant.

What is known about 125 kHz cards

EM or Prox cards at 125 kHz send a fixed identification number to the reader without authentication and without encryption. Any reader working at this frequency reads that number, and the access control system has no way to check whether the card is the original.

The number from such a card can be written onto a blank card or a fob that accepts writes. With a short contact with the original card, a copy can be made in a few seconds. The owner of the original notices nothing, because the card does not change and leaves no trace in the system.

For that reason the security team in this scenario does not look for evidence of a system break-in. It looks for situations where the card number could have been read: a queue at the locker room, a shared table in the canteen, or a card left in a jacket on the floor.

Authentication key length in three card types

Authentication key length in three card typesBar chart: 125 kHz card 0 bits, MIFARE Classic 48 bits, DESFire EV3 128 bits.050100150bit125 kHz card125 kHz card: 0 bit0MIFARE Classic (Crypto1)MIFARE Classic (Crypto1): 48 bit48DESFire EV3 (AES)DESFire EV3 (AES): 128 bit128
Source: NXP (DESFire), ESORICS 2008 publication (Crypto1), public descriptions of EM4100

Steps taken by the security team after the incident

Security does not base its decision on a single recording. It compares the footage with the swipe log, the attendance list and the shift schedule to establish whose card was used and whether the owner was in the plant at that time.

  • Secure the gate footage and the swipe log extract for that shift.
  • Talk to the card owner: where they keep the card and whether they reported it lost.
  • Block the card in the system and issue a replacement card with a new number.
  • Check whether the same number appeared at other gates within a short time.
  • Review card and reader types: establish which access points support 125 kHz only.

Why blocking the card does not close the case

Blocking the number closes this one copy, but it does not remove the cause. Another 125 kHz card can be copied with the same method. The security report therefore records the conclusion that the risk applies to the whole card technology, not to one person.

What changes with a move to 13.56 MHz

The 13.56 MHz band is used, among others, by the ISO/IEC 14443 standard, which covers proximity cards with a range of a few centimeters. The MIFARE DESFire EV3 card in this standard has a hardware AES 128-bit cipher and three-pass mutual authentication, so the reader and the card confirm each other before the reader accepts the number.

In the report for leadership, security compares three levels: a 125 kHz card with no authentication, MIFARE Classic with a 48-bit Crypto1 key, and DESFire EV3 with a 128-bit AES key. Moving to 13.56 MHz alone does not solve the problem if the chosen card is Classic, because its cipher was publicly broken in 2008.

InnerWeb's role in this scenario

InnerWeb does not manufacture or replace readers and access control cards. We integrate with the client's existing access control (KD) system, so a change of card technology on the KD side does not require changes to the authorization logic in our system.

In our training and authorization module, the system never links or redirects an active account based only on a similar surname. After a copied-card incident, security can therefore work on accounts without the risk of mixing up people with similar surnames, and accounts with a card are shown first on the list.

Conclusions and next steps in this scenario

The first conclusion concerns evidence: the footage, the swipe log and the attendance list together make it possible to tell a colleague following through the gate from a copied card. No single source is enough, because the 125 kHz log always shows a valid swipe.

The second conclusion concerns the decision: leadership receives a comparison of three authentication levels and a replacement schedule, not just information about the incident. The third concerns maintenance: after the card change, security records how many times per month two people entered on one swipe, to measure the effect of the change. All three steps can be taken without changing the readers, before a decision on replacing the technology is made.

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Frequently asked questions

Does a copy of a 125 kHz card leave a trace in the access system?

No, because the copy transmits the same number as the original, and the system has no authentication that could tell them apart. A trace can only be found by comparing the log with the footage and the attendance list.

Is blocking the copied card enough?

It is a necessary but insufficient step. Blocking closes one copy, and other cards of this type can be copied with the same method, so a plan to replace the technology is needed.

Does InnerWeb replace readers at the gate?

No. InnerWeb is a software vendor and integrates with the client's existing access control (KD) system. Readers and cards are supplied by the access control system vendor.

Sources

Let's talk about cards in your plant

We will show how the InnerWeb authorization and training system works together with your KD system, whatever the card technology. Book a short call with our team.

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