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FAQ: can 125 kHz access cards be copied

Yes, a 125 kHz card can be copied in a few seconds, because it hands the reader a fixed number without authentication and without encryption. The security manager hears this from the auditor, but needs practical answers: who can do it, what it costs, what to do with the cards at the gate, and where to start. We have collected them in one place.

a few seconds
time needed to write a copy of a 125 kHz card number
Source: general technical knowledge
0
encrypted authentication steps in a 125 kHz card
Source: technical knowledge; public descriptions of EM4100

How a 125 kHz card works and why it can be copied

A 125 kHz card of the EM or Prox type acts as a number transmitter: when it enters the field of a reader, it sends back a fixed identification number and that is the end of the exchange. There is no reader challenge, no answer that depends on a key, and no encryption of the transmission. Every reader working at this frequency reads the same number, including a reader that does not belong to the plant.

This design is what decides the risk. Because the number is the only proof of identity and reading it requires no secret, a copy of the card is as good as the original. Access control systems cannot tell the two apart, because they have no way to do so.

Question: does copying require specialist knowledge?

No. The number that was read can be written to a blank card or a writable key fob, and the whole operation takes a few seconds at short contact with the card. A moment of proximity is enough, for example in a canteen queue or in a changing room where a jacket with the card hangs on a hook.

Question: does this affect only old cards?

It affects every card that transmits only a fixed number. The age of the card does not matter, the technology does. A card bought last year in the 125 kHz standard is just as vulnerable as one from twenty years ago.

What the plant actually risks

The risk is not that someone opens the gate, since a person with a valid card can do that too. The risk is that the attendance log starts to lie. An entry made with someone else's card is recorded as an entry by the card owner, with his or her training, permissions and working hours.

For the security manager this means three categories of consequences. The first is entry of an unauthorised person onto the site or into a zone, for example a warehouse. The second is a false trail in the records, which makes it harder to investigate an incident. The third is presence in a place without a valid training record, because the system will assume that an employee with the training has entered.

  • Unauthorised entry: a person with a copied card passes the gate or door without a trace that it was not the owner.
  • False log: copied card swipes are attributed to the owner and mix with his or her genuine swipes.
  • No evidence for the audit: it cannot be shown who was actually entering at a given time.
  • Trust in presence data: attendance and the evacuation list rely on swipes that may be false.

Encryption key length in card technologies (bits)

Encryption key length in card technologies (bits)Key length comparison: 125 kHz card without cipher 0 bits, MIFARE Classic 48 bits, DESFire EV3 128 bits.050100150bits125 kHz card (no cipher)125 kHz card (no cipher): 0 bits0MIFARE Classic (Crypto1)MIFARE Classic (Crypto1): 48 bits48MIFARE DESFire EV3 (AES)MIFARE DESFire EV3 (AES): 128 bits128
Source: https:/sos.cs.ru.nl/applications/rfid/2008-esorics.pdf; https:/www.nxp.com/products/rfid-nfc/mifare-hf/mifare-desfire

Are 13.56 MHz cards safer in this respect

The 13.56 MHz band supports, among others, the ISO/IEC 14443 standard, which covers proximity cards with a range of a few centimetres. The band alone guarantees nothing: many cards in this band are older designs with weak protection, for example MIFARE Classic. The selection criterion is not the frequency but the authentication mechanism.

A card protected by a modern cipher, such as MIFARE DESFire EV3, performs mutual authentication with the reader and uses 128-bit AES. The number is not the only proof of identity there, so a simple copy of the card stops working. A full comparison of the technologies is on our page about choosing an encrypted card.

What to do with the cards at the gate: a step-by-step decision

The security manager usually does not make the purchasing decision, but he or she supplies the arguments. The sequence below allows the matter to be presented without scaremongering and without postponing it for a year.

The first step is to establish which cards are actually in circulation, because two or three generations often coexist in one plant. The second is to separate high-importance doors, such as a warehouse, a server room or a zone with hazardous substances, from low-importance doors, such as the entrance to a changing room. The third is to choose the doors from which the replacement begins. The fourth is to agree the budget with IT and purchasing.

There is no obligation to replace everything at once. A phased replacement, starting with the doors of greatest importance, gives a real reduction of risk already in the first phase and spreads the cost over time.

Does encrypting the reader link solve the problem

No. An encrypted link between the reader and the controller, for example OSDP with Secure Channel, protects the wire. It does not protect the card. If the card stays at 125 kHz, a copy of the card will be accepted by the reader just like the original, and only afterwards will the data travel securely to the controller.

That is why moving to a newer reader protocol without changing the cards is only part of the solution. Management should know that spending on readers does not close the cloning risk as long as the cards are unprotected.

Where InnerWeb fits in this chain

InnerWeb does not manufacture or replace readers and access control cards. It integrates with the plant's existing access control system: it receives card swipe events by webhook and links them with qualifications, permits, attendance and time recording. As a result, changing the card technology on the access control side does not require a change in permission logic, as long as the access control system still sends the events.

For the security manager this is an important organisational point: the decision about cards is a decision about the access control system, not about the training and permit system. The two layers can be run independently.

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Frequently asked questions

Can a 125 kHz card be copied without the owner knowing?

Yes. A short contact with the card in the field of a compatible reader is enough, because the card requires no confirmation. The owner does not notice that the card was read, and the copy works immediately after being written to a blank medium.

Can we leave the existing 125 kHz cards at less important doors?

Yes, if the risk assessment justifies it. The replacement starts with the doors of highest importance, and the less important ones can be left for a later phase. It is worth recording this decision in the risk assessment, so that the auditor can see the reasoning.

Does replacing the cards change our permit and training system?

No, if the permit system accepts events from the access control system. The medium and the reader on the access control side change, and the swipe still reaches the system as an event. It is worth confirming with the access control vendor that the event format stays the same.

How do we know which cards we have in circulation?

The card type is established by a test read and the documentation of the card vendor. We described this step by step in the guide on checking the card type in the plant.

Sources

Let's talk about the cards at your gate

We will show how the permit and training system works with your access control system regardless of the card technology. Book a conversation or a demo.

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