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Securing access control readers: recommendations for IT and OT

The IT department inherits an access control system with a mix of readers from different years and must decide what to replace and what to protect in another way. The recommendations structure the decision: inventory, protocol criterion, card assessment and compensating measures where replacement is not justified.

150 m
approximate cable reach for Wiegand
Source: public manufacturer article on OSDP
12 h
validity of the JWT token of the access control integration
Source: internal integration sheet

Who this assessment is for and why

The recipient is the IT or OT department, which is responsible for the plant network but not always for the access control system. Card readers stand at the edge of the infrastructure: in corridors, at gates, on the walls of halls. They are physically easy to reach, so securing them is a matter of combining protocol, cabling and card.

The goal of the assessment is a three-part list: readers to replace, readers to protect with compensating measures and readers whose state raises no concerns. Without such a list, a purchase of new devices usually goes to the purchasing department as a one-off package without priorities.

Recommendation 1: make an inventory by protocol

For each reader, record: the protocol to the controller (Wiegand or OSDP), Secure Channel support, the card technology and the mounting location. Wiegand sends data in clear text, so treat every Wiegand reader as an element of increased risk, especially at gates accessible from outside.

For OSDP, check whether Secure Channel is enabled. OSDP in installation mode, without Secure Channel, sends data in clear text. Encryption must be explicitly enabled and the key exchanged in both the reader and the controller. An OSDP reader with encryption switched off does not differ in this respect from Wiegand.

Sample split of 40 readers after the inventory

Sample split of 40 readers after the inventoryBar chart: 10 readers to replace, 18 with compensating measures, 12 with no concerns.05101520readersTo replace: 10 readers10To replaceCompensating measures: 18 readers18Compensating measuresNo concerns: 12 readers12No concerns
Source: Sample calculation: installation of 40 readers and split after the inventory assumed

Recommendation 2: assess the card separately from the reader

Moving from Wiegand to OSDP alone does not secure the card: if the card is 125 kHz or another unprotected technology, it can be cloned in front of the reader. For this reason, add a column for the card technology and the volume of cards in circulation to the inventory.

Replacing readers without replacing cards gives only partial improvement, and replacing the cards without changing the link does too. The order of decisions should follow which layer is weaker at a given location.

Recommendation 3: use compensating measures where replacement does not pay off

A Wiegand reader on an internal office door may stay until its planned replacement, if the line runs in a closed tray and the junction boxes have seals. Removing a Wiegand reader does not raise an alarm, so the compensation is a regular physical inspection and events about series of punches outside working hours.

Compensating measures are not the target state. Record them in a register with a review date and an owner, so that an auditor can see that the risk is managed consciously.

  • seals and locks on distribution boxes
  • review of the punch log for unusual hours
  • limited physical access to the reader line
  • periodic test of removing a reader in the presence of security

Recommendation 4: look after keys and the network

Encryption protects the transmission, but security also depends on how the keys are protected, and with weak key management the system stays exposed. The IT department should know where the Secure Channel key is stored, who has access to it and how it is exchanged during reader service.

On the network side, require that the integration of the access control system with external systems is outbound, on port 443. In the integration with InnerWeb, the connection is initiated by the plant, so no inbound ports need to be opened. Authentication uses a technical account and a JWT token valid for 12 hours.

Recommendation 5: do not transfer responsibility to InnerWeb

InnerWeb does not produce or replace access control readers; it integrates with the client's existing access control system. The software receives punch events, but it does not secure the reader-to-controller link. Responsibility for the choice of readers, protocol and keys rests with the plant and its access control vendor.

It is worth making sure, however, that after a reader replacement the event stream is not interrupted. A change of protocol does not require changes on the InnerWeb side, as long as the access control system keeps sending events, but a test before acceptance is mandatory.

Video

Frequently asked questions

Where should I start the assessment of readers?

With the inventory: protocol, Secure Channel, card technology, mounting location. Without it, replacement priorities cannot be set.

Does every Wiegand reader have to be replaced?

Not at once. On doors with low risk, compensating measures and a replacement plan are enough, but on gates accessible from outside, Wiegand readers are worth replacing first.

Does IT have to open ports for InnerWeb?

No. The access control integration is outbound, on port 443, so inbound ports stay closed.

Sources

Do you have a mix of readers?

Describe your access control system. We will help prepare a punch event specification that survives a reader replacement.

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