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DESFire Card in a Production Plant: Rollout Scenario from the Security Perspective

The security manager of an agricultural machinery plant, part of a global group, plans to replace employee access cards with encrypted DESFire cards. This is a rollout scenario, not a description of a finished project: it shows what security receives at each stage and where InnerWeb works in the chain as a system that complements the existing access control system.

128 bit
AES key length in DESFire EV3
8 bytes
length of the CMAC confirming data authenticity

Starting point: what the security manager has before the migration

The plant runs a working access control system, readers at gates and halls, and an older generation employee card. The security manager is responsible for making sure only authorised people enter, and that evacuation and audit lists always show who is on site. For him, replacing the cards is a risk decision, not a gadget purchase.

The scenario assumes that the group's management expects a higher security level for the credential, while the local plant does not want to replace readers or rebuild the access control system. This condition matters: InnerWeb is a software producer, not a device maker. It does not manufacture or replace access control readers or access control cards, so the whole project is built on what the plant already has.

Why DESFire: what the chip maker declares

The chip maker describes MIFARE DESFire EV3 as a chip with a high security level for contactless services, including access control. Encryption is performed by hardware AES with 128-bit keys and a key version number, and data authenticity is ensured by an 8-byte CMAC. The card also has proximity checking as protection against relay attacks.

For security, three consequences matter more than the algorithm names. First, reading the card number is not enough to clone the card, because the reader and the card authenticate each other. Second, the card can have an optional random identifier, which does not reveal the permanent UID during a read. Third, several independent applications can run on one card, each with its own keys.

  • Mutual authentication instead of simply reading the number.
  • A random identifier as a privacy feature, not a key mechanism.
  • Several applications on one card, each with its own set of keys.

Example split of card issuing by stage (people)

Example split of card issuing by stage (people)Bar chart: 120, 240, 240 and 120 cards issued in the four consecutive weeks050100150200250peopleWeek 1: 120 people120 peopleWeek 1Week 2: 240 people240 peopleWeek 2Week 3: 240 people240 peopleWeek 3Week 4: 120 people120 peopleWeek 4
Source: Example calculation: 720 employees, issuing over four weeks, three shifts

What the card does not decide

An encrypted card does not replace the access decision: it verifies the identity of the credential, and entry is decided by the permissions on the system side. This sentence is worth keeping in front of every manager. An employee with a new generation card but without a valid safety training or without qualification for dangerous work still should not enter a workstation where these requirements apply.

This is where InnerWeb comes in. The system receives card swipe events from the existing access control system and links them with qualifications, work permits, attendance and time recording. The security manager therefore gets not only the information that a door opened, but also the context: who, with which permissions, and under which work permit.

Scenario step by step

The sequence below is a concept for a plant of this type. Each stage has one owner on the plant side and a result that security can check on its own.

Stage 1: inventory and decision on scope

Security together with IT establishes how many cards are in circulation, which doors and gates handle which card types, and who the access control supplier is. The result is a list of control points and a decision whether the migration covers all employees at once or in groups. In the same stage the applications to be placed on the card are chosen, for example access to the plant and possibly other services.

Stage 2: keys and the first batch of cards

The access control supplier or the plant generates a master key, and each card gets a diversified key derived from the master key and its own UID. This is key diversification known from secure card ecosystems, based among others on the key derivation function from NIST SP 800-108. The keys stay with the plant and its access control supplier, InnerWeb does not need them.

Stage 3: connecting events to InnerWeb

The access control system sends card swipe events to InnerWeb by webhook. The platform also provides a REST API and webhooks, so the same mechanism will serve later extensions. When the plant network blocks outgoing traffic from the application host, webhooks are stored durably in a queue and collected by a poller over an inbound channel.

Stage 4: security screen and the verdict at the gate

The screen for security shows a verdict made of valid trainings, qualifications for dangerous work, work permits in progress and an active account. Scanning a QR badge or an RFID card records the entry. For visitors and contractors without a card, the plant keeps QR badges, described in a separate material on employee cards and badges.

Pitfalls that security will notice first

The first pitfall is accounts without a link to a card. On installations with entry cards, the training result is carried over to the account with the card, so that the gate stops reporting a missing training, and the system never merges accounts by surname alone. This protects against mixing up two people with the same surname, but it means the accounts must be tidied up before the migration.

The second pitfall is shift work. Replacing all cards in one day will block the night shift if the issuing point is open only during the day. Good practice is a transition window in which the gate accepts both card types, and an issuing duty on every shift. The third pitfall concerns roles: security is often not the owner of the keys, so an explicit split of responsibility between security, IT and the access control supplier is needed.

Result for the security manager

After the scenario is completed, security has a card that cannot be copied just by reading its number, and a system that decides access on the basis of permissions rather than just possession of the credential. The plant does not replace readers and does not change the access control supplier. The figures below come from an example calculation and serve planning, not comparisons with other plants.

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Frequently asked questions

Do I have to replace the readers to deploy DESFire?

It depends on the reader model in the plant and on the decision of the access control supplier. InnerWeb does not manufacture or replace readers, so this element is the responsibility of the plant and its access control supplier.

Does an encrypted card replace safety training in the system?

No. The card confirms the identity of the credential, and the validity of trainings and qualifications is checked by the permissions system. The screen for security combines both elements into one verdict.

Who should keep the master keys?

The plant or its access control supplier, in a controlled environment with a backup copy. InnerWeb does not need card keys to receive swipe events.

What about guests and contractors without a card?

They can use QR badges with a unique, random token. Revoking a badge issues a new one, and the badge history is kept.

Sources

Let's talk about the card in your plant

We will show how swipes from the existing access control system connect with permissions in InnerWeb, without replacing readers. Book a short conversation with the InnerWeb team.

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