Why a clone shows in the log, not on the card
A card clone is a copy of identification data which, from the reader's point of view, looks like the original. Older 125 kHz contactless cards, and cards that identify themselves only with a fixed number, can be copied with a cheap device. Cards with encrypted communication, for example based on NXP MIFARE DESFire with key authentication, are more resistant, but no system rules out a configuration error or a leaked key.
That is why the plant treats cloning as an event to be detected, not only as something to prevent. Two people with the same card identity leave a trace in the log that the real owner alone would not leave. The task of security is to read that trace.
Signal one: entry without exit
A gate scan is a control act: a green verdict records an entry or exit, while a red verdict records a refusal entry that does not count as presence on site. A real employee who has entered must eventually leave, and this leaves a pair of events. If the log shows a second entry from the same card although there was no first exit, and the person has only one body, then one of the two copies is the one entering.
This signal can also have innocent sources: someone left through a side exit without scanning, or punched the card in a hurry. That is why a single pair does not settle the matter. Action is worth taking only when it recurs, for example three such pairs within one week for one card.
How does the system tidy up entries without an exit?
An automatic exit command, run every 3 hours, closes the entries of people who have been on site for more than 12 hours and marks them as closed automatically. Such entries can be filtered and reviewed separately. The On site list, refreshed every 13 seconds, shows current presence, and automatically closed entries are the first place to look for entries without a pair.
Technical parameters that matter when reviewing punches
Signal two: refusals from the same card
If a card has been blocked and scans from it still keep appearing, someone is trying to use it. A refusal entry contains, in the verdict snapshot, the reason and the names of the missing trainings and qualifications, and a refusal also sends a notification stating what is missing. In practice a series of refusals from one card, especially from different gates or at unusual hours, is a signal to examine who is holding it.
When assessing this, technical noise has to be set aside. A repeated scan of the same code is rejected as a duplicate: the server applies a 5-second window, and the interface adds a further 2584 ms window. Two entries a few seconds apart are usually a repeated tap, not an attack. Series that are longer and spread over time are far more significant.
Signal three: punches at impossible times
The strongest signal is two punches of the same card at places between which it is not possible to travel in the time that elapsed. If the north gate recorded an entry at 7:00 and a gate on the far side of the plant at 7:02, and the walk takes a quarter of an hour, the card was in two places at once. The conclusion is then one of two things: there are two copies, or the clock reading is faulty.
InnerWeb receives card punch events from the client's access control system via webhook and links them with qualifications, permissions, presence and time and attendance records. The system thus delivers the log in one place, and the analysis of impossible distances is a review that security or IT carries out on the exported events. We do not promise automatic recognition of clones, only well-organised material for that review.
What to do after a suspicion: order of actions
After noticing any of the three signals the same order applies. First, block the card in the access control system, because the procedure for blocking the physical card sits with the access control system. Next, deactivate the person's QR badge if they have one, where deactivation creates a new record instead of overwriting the old one and the history is kept. Only at the end, talk to the owner, who receives a new card and a temporary badge.
- Secure an extract of the access log covering the two weeks before the suspicion, before changing anything.
- Block the card in the access control system and deactivate the person's QR badge.
- Issue a new card and check whether the previous generation of keys may have been exposed.
- Report the event to the security manager and the data protection officer as a card incident.
- Review the punches of other cards issued in the same batch or at the same time.
Checklist
Video
Frequently asked questions
Can every contactless card be cloned?
No. Cards of older technologies that identify themselves with a fixed number are susceptible to copying. Cards with encrypted communication and a key are more resistant, but they require correct key management.
Will InnerWeb recognise a cloned card on its own?
InnerWeb organises punch events from the access control system and links them with presence, refusals and qualifications. Assessing whether a clone lies behind the events is done by a person, on that data.
After a clone is detected, must the incident be reported?
Yes, internally as a card incident. Whether it must be reported externally is assessed by the data protection officer or the security department, based on the consequences.
Put the access log in order for review
We will show how events from the access control system link with presence and refusals in the security panel. Book a conversation with the InnerWeb team.
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