What exactly is wrong with MIFARE Classic
MIFARE Classic uses the proprietary Crypto1 stream cipher with a 48-bit key. Two elements of this design are the problem: the key is short by today's standards, and the cipher itself did not undergo open cryptographic review, because it was kept secret. Designs like this rarely survive contact with researchers.
That is exactly what happened. The Crypto1 cipher was reconstructed from the physical chip and broken by university researchers, and the results were published at the ESORICS conference in 2008. Since then the weaknesses have been widely known, and the chip maker recommends moving away from this technology in new systems.
Question: how quickly can the key be recovered?
The described attacks allow the sector key to be recovered after capturing one or two partial authentications from a reader, in the order of seconds. This means there is no need to stay next to the card for hours: it is enough to eavesdrop on a short exchange between the card and the reader.
Question: does a plant-unique key change anything?
Very little. A unique sector key makes accidental reading harder, but since the attack recovers the key from a captured authentication, uniqueness alone does not stop a determined person. The problem lies in the cipher, not in how the keys are distributed.
UID: a separate risk the auditor will also notice
Many access control deployments do not read the data in the card sectors and rely only on the UID number. In that case the whole protection comes down to the reader knowing the number. MIFARE Classic is also vulnerable to reading and rewriting the UID on clone cards with a changeable UID, if the system relies on the UID alone.
In practice this means that even a plant which never used the encrypted sectors carries the same risk as with a 125 kHz card: a copy of the number is enough. The IT administrator should therefore check not only the card type but also the way the access control system reads it.
Key length: MIFARE Classic and DESFire EV3 (bits)
Is it still allowed to use MIFARE Classic
No regulation prohibits using this technology in a plant. There is, however, an obligation to adapt protection measures to the risk, and the auditor will assess whether the risk has been recognised and whether there is a plan of action. Leaving MIFARE Classic at doors of low importance may be justified, but at the doors to a warehouse, a production zone or a server room it usually is not.
A good way forward is to record the decision in the risk register: where the technology stays, why, until when, and which compensating measures apply, for example a camera at the door or additional verification at the gate.
What to replace MIFARE Classic with
The natural successor in the same band and the same ISO/IEC 14443 standard is MIFARE DESFire EV3. It works under ISO/IEC 14443 type A and offers a hardware AES 128-bit cipher with three-pass mutual authentication. Multi-technology readers often support both card families, which makes it possible to run the migration without replacing everything at once.
DESFire EV3 also provides encryption of the radio transmission, a CMAC code for data authenticity, proximity checking against relay attacks and a check of the chip's originality. For the IT administrator one more point matters: up to 14 keys per application and one master key per card, which allows keys of different systems to be separated on one card.
A five-step migration plan
Migration from MIFARE Classic does not have to be a one-off event. The sequence below works well when readers and cards are in several generations and the plant runs three shifts and cannot interrupt entries.
Step one is an inventory: how many Classic cards there are, in which employee groups, at which doors. Step two is choosing the doors for the first phase based on the importance of the assets they protect. Step three is multi-technology readers where a transition period is needed. Step four is issuing new cards by group and withdrawing the old ones. Step five is closing the transition period, switching off Classic support in the readers and making the entry in the documentation.
The technical details and migration pitfalls are described on our page about migrating to DESFire. For the auditor, however, it is enough to have a schedule and a justification for the order of the steps.
What changes for the permit and training system
InnerWeb does not manufacture or replace readers and access control cards. It integrates with the client's existing access control system: it receives card swipe events by webhook and links them with qualifications, permits, attendance and time recording. Replacing the card technology on the access control side therefore does not require a change in permission logic.
For the IT administrator this means that the card replacement project can be run by the access control vendor, while the training and permit layer remains stable. It is enough to confirm that the event format and the employee identifier in the event do not change.
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Frequently asked questions
Is the auditor right to point at MIFARE Classic as the weak link?
Yes. The Crypto1 cipher has been broken and described in a publication from 2008, and the attacks recover the key in the order of seconds. A sensible answer is not an argument but a plan with a schedule and compensating measures until the cards are replaced.
Is it enough to change the keys on the Classic cards?
No. The attack recovers the key from a captured authentication, so changing the key does not remove the weakness of the cipher. A key change makes sense as a temporary measure, but it does not replace a change of technology.
Do the readers have to be replaced together with the cards?
It depends on the model. Many multi-technology readers support DESFire after an update or configuration, but this must be confirmed with the access control vendor. Check it before ordering the cards, so that you do not buy media which the readers cannot read.
Does InnerWeb need changes on the permission side when the cards change?
No, as long as the access control system keeps sending swipe events in the agreed format. The change of card technology happens on the access control side and does not touch the permission logic.
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Has the auditor flagged MIFARE Classic?
We will go through with you how the permit and training system works with access control during the card migration. Book a conversation or a demo.
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