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Key separation on a card: how to split applications between suppliers

When one card serves access control, the canteen and training, the question of keys becomes a question of responsibility. The MIFARE DESFire EV3 card lets each function live in its own application with its own keys. We show how to use this in an IT/OT project, so that a leak of one key does not open the others.

14
keys per application of the DESFire EV3 card according to the manufacturer
AES-128
standard of the application keys

What a multi-application card gives you

The MIFARE DESFire EV3 card has several applications, and each application has its own keys. According to the manufacturer, the card has one master key and up to 14 keys per application, using the AES-128 standard. This is an architecture in which different suppliers can each have their place on the same card.

The application keys are separate from the card's master key, and data integrity is ensured by an 8-byte CMAC code. As a result, the canteen supplier maintains its application without knowing the keys of the access control supplier. The card complies with the ISO/IEC 14443 standard, so a reader supporting that standard can read its applications after successful authentication.

The division principle: who owns which key

Separation makes sense only when each application has one key owner and the owners do not repeat. Good practice is a responsibility table drawn up before the first card personalisation: application, function, supplier, key owner, storage location and rotation procedure.

The most important decision concerns the card's master key. Whoever knows it can create and delete applications. In a project with several suppliers, the master key should belong to the plant or to one trusted entity, not to the supplier of one of the functions.

  • access control application: keys held by the access control supplier,
  • canteen or payment application: keys held by the supplier of that service,
  • training or identification application: keys held by the owner of the OHS process,
  • card master key: the plant or a designated trusted entity.

Example allocation: application keys on one card (example calculation)

Example allocation: application keys on one card (example calculation)Example allocation: three keys for access control, two for the canteen and two for training.0123keysAccess control: 3 keys3 keysAccess controlCanteen: 2 keys2 keysCanteenTraining: 2 keys2 keysTraining
Source: Example calculation: assumed allocation within the limit of 14 keys per application

What InnerWeb does in this chain, and what it does not

InnerWeb neither produces nor replaces access control readers and does not personalise cards. It receives punch events from the existing access control system by webhook, authenticated with a technical account and a JWT token valid for 12 hours, and in the event the card number takes the form object_code-number. The cryptographic keys of the cards stay with the access control supplier.

This separation is favourable to key separation: software that links a punch with trainings and time attendance does not need to know the application keys. There is therefore no need to pass keys to another party.

Rotation, withdrawal and incident

Plan three scenarios in advance: planned key rotation, loss of a card and suspicion of a supplier key leak. When rotating application keys you do not need to touch the other applications, which is the essence of separation. When a card is lost, cancellation on the access control side works, and for passages with a QR code, cancelling the badge issues a new one while keeping the history.

In case of a suspected leak, check the scope: which key, of which application, and held by whom. If the canteen application key leaked and the access control keys are different, the incident does not change the state of access control. This requires proper documentation, however, and its absence is the most common reason why separation exists only in theory.

Mistakes that undo separation

The most common mistake is using the same key for all applications, because "it was simpler at deployment". The second is storing keys in a spreadsheet or in the same repository that several suppliers can access. The third is diversifying keys without documenting the formula, so that after a change of supplier nobody can reproduce the keys.

The fourth mistake is skipping the exit plan: the contract with the supplier should clearly state who hands over or destroys the keys, and when, after the cooperation ends.

Checklist

Video

Frequently asked questions

Does every supplier need the card's master key?

No. The master key allows creating and deleting applications, so it should stay with the plant or a trusted entity. Suppliers need only the keys of their own applications.

Does InnerWeb know the card keys?

No. InnerWeb receives punch events from the access control system and does not personalise cards, so the keys stay with the access control supplier.

What protects the integrity of the data on the card?

According to the manufacturer, integrity is ensured by an 8-byte CMAC code, and the application keys are separate from the master key.

Sources

Are you designing cards with several suppliers?

We will help establish where InnerWeb fits in the chain and what stays with the card suppliers. Book a meeting.

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