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Recommendations: roles in managing card keys

The card master key is the most valuable secret of an access control system, and in many plants one person knows it, or worse, it sits in an import script file. Below are the roles divided between IT, security and HR, and recommendations that allow the plant to pass an audit without heavy bureaucracy.

3
roles: IT, security, HR
Source: own elaboration
2
people with key access (master and deputy)
Source: recommendation

Why a role, not a person

The master key makes it possible to calculate the keys of all cards in the plant. If it leaks, every card issued on its basis is at risk, and replacing the keys means personalising the whole pool of cards again. That is why the question is not whom we trust, but how to split access so that a single person cannot issue a card with permissions or recreate the key alone.

Dividing the roles also helps in practice: when the key administrator changes jobs or is on leave, the plant is not left without the ability to issue cards.

Recommendation 1: appoint a separate key administrator role

The master key should not be stored in a file or in an import script. Good practice is a separate key administrator role and a backup kept separately. The key administrator does not have to be the same person as the access control system administrator or the person issuing cards.

In a plant with several hundred cards, two people are enough: the main key administrator from IT and a deputy who has access to the backup only in the event of a failure. The deputy arrangement should be written into the procedure, not agreed verbally.

Sample division of roles in the card lifecycle (assumption)

Sample division of roles in the card lifecycle (assumption)Donut chart: IT 2 steps, security 2 steps, HR 1 step.IT: keys and personalisation: 2 steps (40%)Security: issue and blocking: 2 steps (40%)HR: approval of the person: 1 steps (20%)5stepsIT: keys and personalisation2 steps (40%)Security: issue and blocking2 steps (40%)HR: approval of the person1 steps (20%)
Source: Sample calculation: five steps of the card lifecycle divided between three roles

Recommendation 2: security issues, IT generates keys, HR approves people

The division of duties can be written in three sentences. IT is responsible for the keys and the personalisation station. Security is responsible for the physical issue of the card and its blocking after a loss is reported. HR is responsible for who gets a card at all, because it knows the hire date, the change of position and the end of the contract.

In practice this means that none of these three units can carry out the full cycle alone: generate a key, issue a card and approve a person. Even when the plant is small, separating at least two of the three steps reduces the risk of misuse.

Recommendation 3: diversification instead of one shared key

Key diversification means that the card key is derived from the master key and the unique UID of the card, so the leak of one card key does not open the others. For roles this has a consequence: the key administrator never needs to show the master key to the operator of the personalisation station.

If the SAM module is part of the readers, the master keys are stored in a protected chip and never leave the reader. In that case the risk of a leak is reduced even further, because nobody has access to the key in plain form.

Recommendation 4: backup kept separately

The backup of the master key should be stored in a different place from the system it comes from: in a locked cabinet or a safe, with a register entry of who accessed it and when. A backup that sits on the same server is not a backup, but a second place for a leak.

Once a year it is worth carrying out a restore test in the presence of two people, to confirm that the procedure works and that the copy is readable. The result of the test is recorded in the card register.

Recommendation 5: operation register and quarterly review

The card register should contain the number, the person, the issue date, the status (active, blocked, returned), the reason for the change and the person who carried out the operation. The last field matters for roles: it shows whether the same operator both issues and blocks cards, and whether the division actually works.

The quarterly review compares the register with the employee list from HR. Active cards without a person and people without a card are signals to be explained. InnerWeb adds to this the check of duplicate account pairs, because a card assigned to the wrong account breaks the whole division of roles.

Scenarios: what to do when a role changes

The key administrator leaves the company: the deputy takes over the role on the day the contract ends, and the plant assesses whether access to the backup requires changing its location or the safe code. The assessment is recorded in the register, even if the result is: no change.

The personalisation station operator reports a suspicion that a card reached a person without permissions: security blocks the card immediately, HR checks whether the person is on the list, and IT checks the operation register. Only after these three steps is a decision taken to replace the keys, because replacement is costly and affects the whole pool.

The plant adds a new hall or an external company: the master key stays unchanged, and new cards receive keys calculated through diversification. There is no need to create a separate master key for each company, unless the contract or the internal security policy requires it.

The common principle behind these scenarios is that every change of role has a date, an approving person and an entry in the register. Without this, the division of roles exists only on paper.

How this connects with InnerWeb

InnerWeb does not store the card master key and does not manufacture readers. It receives card tap events from the access control system, links them with qualifications, permits and attendance, and provides audit evidence of who tapped the card, when and where. The division of roles on the plant's side determines how reliable that evidence is.

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Frequently asked questions

How many people should know the master key?

In a mid-sized plant, two: the key administrator and a deputy with access to the backup only in the event of a failure.

Can the key be kept in the card import script?

No. The master key should not be stored in a file or in an import script.

Where should the key backup be stored?

Separately from the source system, with an access register and an annual restore test.

Sources

Let us set the division of roles in your plant

We will prepare with you a short procedure for the IT, security and HR roles and a card register template for the quarterly review.

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