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Where to store a biometric template: recommendations for IT and OT

A biometric template may sit on the reader, on the employee's card or on the access control server. Each of these locations changes the risk of a leak, the scope of responsibility and the cost of operation. Below are recommendations for the administrator designing the architecture for the plant.

500
templates exposed in a central database leak in the assumption
Source: example calculation
1
template affected by a lost card in the assumption
Source: example calculation

What a template is and why its location matters

A biometric template is a mathematical representation of features, not a picture of a fingerprint. It nevertheless remains personal data, because it serves to uniquely identify a person. It is also a special category of data within the meaning of Article 9 GDPR.

Unlike a password or a card, a template cannot be changed after a leak, because a body feature is permanent. This is one of the reasons for the high risk in the impact assessment. Since a leak cannot be undone, the location of the template becomes the main design decision.

Three locations and their consequences

Article 25 GDPR requires data protection by design, which for biometrics means, among other things, storing the template in a way that limits the risk of its reconstruction. Article 32 adds the requirement of technical measures appropriate to the risk, including encryption and access control.

Template on the reader

Templates are held in the memory of the device. The advantage: there is no central database, so no single point to steal. The drawback: if the reader is lost or stolen, the data is on it, and managing deletion across many devices can be difficult.

Template on the employee's card

The template is stored on the proximity card and compared in the reader. The data is in the employee's hands, not in a central database. The risk is losing the card, so the record must be encrypted, and the card must not reveal the template without the reader's key.

Template on the KD system server

A central database makes management and deletion easier, but creates an attractive target. It requires encryption, access control for administrators, backups with the same level of protection and an access log.

Templates exposed in a single incident, example

Templates exposed in a single incident, exampleHorizontal bar chart: 500 templates exposed in the central database, 50 in one reader's memory and 1 on a card.0100200300400500templatesCentral databaseCentral database: 500 templates500Reader memoryReader memory: 50 templates50Employee cardEmployee card: 1 templates1
Source: Example calculation: 500 employees and the assumption of 10 readers with 50 templates each in memory.

Recommendations for the IT/OT administrator

The list below organises architectural decisions and can serve as a starting point for a design document attached to the impact assessment.

  • prefer a location where compromising one element does not expose all templates
  • encrypt templates at rest and in transit with keys managed outside the device
  • separate a network segment for readers and controllers and limit traffic to what is necessary
  • cover templates with the same level of protection in backups
  • record in a log who accessed the templates and when
  • plan the deletion of templates after an employee leaves, in all locations

What InnerWeb stores and what it does not

InnerWeb is a software producer and does not manufacture readers. An access event can consist of a person identifier and a timestamp, so InnerWeb needs no biometric template or any body features for it.

Each client has an isolated instance with its own database, in Docker containers, also on the client's server. This limits the number of places where personal data goes. Templates remain in the plant's KD system and do not travel to further systems such as RCP or HR.

Example calculation: the size of the problem in a leak

Assume 500 employees. With templates in a central database, a single successful leak exposes 500 templates at once. With templates on cards, a single event, such as a lost card, affects one template. These are illustrative assumptions showing the order of magnitude of the risk, not its probability.

The probability differs between architectures, so the impact assessment should weigh both factors: the scale of the effect and the chance of the event.

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Frequently asked questions

Is a template on a card always better?

Not always. It limits the scale of a leak, but requires encryption and a procedure for a lost card. The choice depends on the impact assessment.

Is a biometric template a picture of a fingerprint?

No, it is a mathematical representation of features, but it is still personal data used to uniquely identify a person.

Does InnerWeb need access to templates?

No. An access event with a person identifier and a timestamp is enough.

Sources

Let us design an architecture without templates in InnerWeb

Let us talk about receiving access events from your KD system by webhook, so that templates never leave your system.

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