Where the obligation comes from and what it covers
Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (CER) requires critical entities to apply physical and organisational measures that prevent incidents, protect the site, respond to an event and mitigate its effects. The Polish provisions implementing CER set a timetable: risk assessment within 9 months of notification of entry on the list, implementation of measures within 3 months after the assessment, documentation within 15 months of entry.
Physical protection does not operate in a vacuum. A plant that is also an essential entity under the amended Polish National Cybersecurity System Act (KSC) has cybersecurity obligations in parallel. The obligations of Chapter 3 of that Act must be met by 3 April 2027, and the first audit of an essential entity falls due by 3 April 2028. The penalties under Article 73(1)–(4) can be imposed for the first time after 3 April 2028, so the years 2026–2028 are a window for building evidence, not for catching up on it.
The practical conclusion: a physical protection system is described by one set of documents that answers the requirements of CER, KSC and the existing rules on the protection of persons and property. Separate HSE, security and cybersecurity procedures are the most common source of gaps, because nobody is responsible for the points where they meet.
Step 1: threat analysis and scenarios
The analysis starts from assets, not from the fence. For each area of the plant you record what is critical there (control room, switchgear, substance storage, OT server room), who has access, and what happens if an unauthorised person gains access or if the area is cut off.
Scenarios are written briefly and in a way that can be tested: who, by what route, why, for how long, with what effect. A good scenario can be rehearsed at the gatehouse and in the control room. A bad scenario is a generality such as "unauthorised access to the site".
- an inventory of areas and assets with an owner for each area
- a list of threats: unauthorised entry, abuse of privileges, sabotage, theft, power failure, external event
- an assessment of consequences for process continuity and for people
- a decision on which risks are handled by a physical measure and which by an organisational or digital one
CER deadlines counted from entry on the list
Step 2: division into zones
Zones organise access decisions. Four levels are enough: public (car park, reception), plant (the area behind the gate), operational (installations and halls) and critical (control rooms, switchgear, server rooms, hazardous substance storage). Each zone has an owner, an entry rule and a list of people or roles who may stay in it.
Zone boundaries are drawn on the plant plan and matched to reality: fence, door, airlock, gate. A boundary drawn on paper that does not exist on the ground is not a boundary. The principles of defining zones are described on a separate page on good practice for access zones.
Step 3: access control
Access control answers one question at every entry: does this person have the right to be here now. In InnerWeb software, security scans a QR badge or an RFID card and receives a verdict based on valid training, qualifications for hazardous work, a permit in progress and an active account. Every scan is stored in the entry and exit register, and security sees the verdict and the missing elements instead of the full view of permits.
The badge carries a random QR token that contains no personal data. Revoking a badge issues a new one, and the history of previous badges stays in the system. Visitors are registered by reception: from a first and last name an external account with a record number and a printed badge is created in a single action.
The system gives a verdict and a record and does not control the barrier. The guard admits people physically, which is a deliberate division of responsibility: the decision and the evidence sit with the system, the action with the person. Roles and permissions come from a role matrix with inheritance, and roles are granted along a seniority ladder.
Step 4: technical and physical protection
Technical protection (fences, lighting, monitoring, alarm systems) and physical protection (security staff, patrols) complement each other. Technology detects, a person verifies and responds, and access control joins both layers into a record of events. Check whether the time from alarm to response is measured and not assumed.
For protecting a large site, independent location helps: position is calculated from the signals of many beacons averaged on a map, works without GPS, plant roads are covered with beacons about every 100 m, and inside a building there is one beacon per 100–200 m². A patrol recorded in the system becomes evidence that the route was walked.
What to put in the protection instruction
The instruction should contain entry rules for employees, visitors, couriers, suppliers and external firms, an emergency entry procedure, rules for what to do when an entry condition is not valid, and the way a shift is handed over. Every item has a responsible person.
Audit evidence
An auditor does not assess intentions, only traces. The software provides audit evidence in the form of an entry and exit register, a list of people on site, badge history and a record of verdicts, but it is the plant that decides which rules those records reflect. The system supports meeting the requirement; it does not replace risk assessment or management decisions.
A good test is an exercise: pick a random day from a quarter ago and reconstruct who entered the critical zone, on what basis and who approved it. If the answer takes hours, evidence is missing.
Checklist
Video
Frequently asked questions
Is QR access control enough as physical protection?
No. It decides on the right of entry and records the event, but the fence, monitoring and security response are still needed. The system supports meeting the requirement; it does not replace the whole of protection.
Does the system control a gate or barrier?
No. It gives a verdict and a record, and the guard admits people physically. Controlling devices requires a separate integration on the plant's side.
When should we start, if penalties apply only from 2028?
Right away. The obligations of Chapter 3 of the KSC Act run until 3 April 2027, and evidence has to be collected in advance, because it cannot be reconstructed retroactively.
Sources
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