Why vendor access is the first topic for OT
An industrial plant rarely maintains all of its systems on its own. The line manufacturer, the controller integrator, the SCADA supplier and the maintenance contractor usually each have their own connection channel: a GSM modem, a VPN tunnel, a remote desktop program or an account on the administrative network. Over time this produces a dozen or so paths that nobody at the plant has a full picture of.
In its 2025 annual report, CERT Polska described what this looks like from the attacker's side. When testing VNC desktops used in small hydropower plants, wastewater treatment plants and pumping stations, researchers found passwords such as 111111 and 12345678. Hacktivists exploit the same weaknesses. They do not need an exploit: uncontrolled remote access is enough.
Article 21 of the NIS2 Directive lists supply chain security, access control and asset management, and multi-factor authentication among the risk management measures. In Poland these requirements are introduced by the Act of 23 January 2026 amending the Polish National Cybersecurity System Act (KSC), published in Dz.U. 2026 item 252 and in force since 3 April 2026. Vendor access touches all of these points at once, which is why it is worth starting there.
Step 1: inventory every access path
Start with a list, not with a tool. For each remote path, record who uses it (the company and the specific people), what it connects to (a controller, an HMI panel, a SCADA server, an engineering workstation), through which channel (VPN, modem, remote desktop, private APN), who at the plant approved it and when it was last used.
Two groups are the hardest to find: old modems installed next to a machine by the integrator, and shared accounts created for commissioning and never disabled. Three sources help: a review of service contracts, a conversation with the maintenance team and a scan of your own internet exposure, for example through the moje.cert.pl service.
- The result of the inventory is a register of paths, with an owner on the plant side for each one.
- Paths with no owner, no use for 90 days or no contract are scheduled for shutdown.
- Paths that must stay move on to steps 2 to 5.
Transitional periods from the Act's entry into force
Step 2: named accounts and roles instead of shared accounts
A shared account such as 'service' cannot answer the question of who changed a setpoint at three in the morning. Every person on the vendor side should have a named account tied to the company and to the contract. This rule matches the identification and authentication requirement (FR1) of ISA/IEC 62443-3-3 and the multi-factor authentication requirement of NIS2.
In InnerWeb, permissions come from roles with inheritance and a scope matrix, and roles are granted along a seniority ladder: you cannot grant a role higher than your own. Login can be strengthened with multi-factor authentication (an e-mail code or TOTP), enabled for a selected installation. A trusted device is not asked for the second factor at every login, which reduces the burden on teams working in shifts.
Rules for vendor accounts
A good policy is short and measurable. The points below can be written into a procedure unchanged and checked during an audit.
- One account is one person, with no password sharing.
- The account is assigned to a company and to a valid service contract.
- The second factor is required at every login from outside the plant network.
- Permissions are limited to specific systems, not to the whole OT zone.
Step 3: time-limited access and plant approval for every session
The safest connection is the one that does not exist at a given moment. Service access should be opened for a specific job, in a specific time window and with a specific scope, then closed automatically afterwards. A simple flow is enough: a vendor request, a decision by the person designated at the plant, opening of access, and closing after the time expires or after the end of work is reported.
In the LivePermit SSO panel, access requests submitted in the portal are reviewed at the plant, and the plant has a log of data exchange with the portal. The decision always belongs to the plant: access is never granted automatically without its consent. For hazardous work, the same request can be linked to a work permit, which closes the gap between logical and physical access.
Step 4: logging service sessions
A session register answers three questions: who, when and why. The minimum is a login log with the person's identifier, start and end time, and the number of the approval or work order. A higher level is a recording of the session or a log of the commands sent to the controller. The scope depends on how critical the system is: for a process safety zone it is worth recording more than for an administrative back office.
Logs must be protected the way evidence is protected. In a December 2025 incident at a small combined heat and power plant, the attackers deleted logs and reset communication devices to hamper the analysis. For this reason the session log should go to a server where the vendor has no write or delete permissions.
Step 5: revoking access when the work is finished
Revoking access is the most commonly skipped stage. After the order is completed, the account should expire on its own rather than wait for manual shutdown. Once a quarter, run a review: list the active vendor accounts, compare them with the list of valid contracts and close everything that has no coverage. The same review covers devices: modems, VPN keys and certificates assigned to contracts that have ended.
The vendor offboarding checklist should include: disabling named accounts, revoking certificates and keys, removing firewall rules, returning or disabling physical modems, and written confirmation from the vendor.
Audit evidence and deadlines
All five steps end with a document: the path register, the account list, the session approvals, the session log and the access revocation record. This set provides audit evidence and supports meeting the Article 21 NIS2 requirement, but it does not replace a full information security management system.
Under the Act of 23 January 2026, entities have 12 months from its entry into force to meet the obligations of Chapter 3 (the information security management system and incident procedures), that is until 3 April 2027. The first audit of a key entity falls after 24 months, and financial penalties can in principle be imposed from 3 April 2028. The penalty for a key entity reaches EUR 10 million or 2% of turnover. These deadlines are an opportunity to put access in order without the pressure of an incident.
Checklist
Video
Frequently asked questions
Does vendor remote access have to be disabled completely?
No. The requirement is about control, not a ban. Access must be named, time-limited, approved by the plant and logged. Paths with no owner and no contract should be shut down.
Where do we start if we do not know all the connections?
Start with a review of service contracts, a conversation with the maintenance team and a check of internet exposure. The register will begin as an incomplete list and be extended with every session.
Is the IEC 62443 standard mandatory?
The series is voluntary, but it is a recognised reference when assessing the Article 21 NIS2 measures. Part 2-4 covers requirements for integrators and service providers.
Does InnerWeb grant access automatically?
No. Access requests are reviewed at the plant, and the decision belongs to the person designated on the plant side.
Sources
Let's talk about vendor access control
We will show, using your own plant as an example, how named accounts, session approvals and an access log support NIS2 compliance and provide audit evidence. Book a conversation with the InnerWeb team.
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