What exactly does the DESFire EV3 card encrypt?
The chip maker describes DESFire EV3 as a high security solution for contactless city services, including access control. Encryption is done by a hardware AES module with 128-bit keys, and every key has a version number, so keys can be replaced on a planned schedule.
An important distinction for security: the communication channel between the card and the reader is encrypted, and so is the data in the card applications, not just the number. A reader that does not know the application key cannot read the protected files, even if the card lies on its surface.
Data authenticity is confirmed by an 8-byte CMAC code attached to the messages. Changing even one byte in transit invalidates the code, so the reader rejects such a message.
Can the card be cloned, and why was cloning old cards easy?
125 kHz cards and some older 13.56 MHz cards answer with a fixed number without authentication: anyone who brings a device close to the card copies the number in a fraction of a second. With DESFire EV3, reading the number alone is not enough, because entry depends on a correct mutual authentication using an AES key that the card never releases.
The manufacturer does not promise that no attack will ever be developed, so we recommend treating cards as one layer of protection, not as a wall. The most common real weaknesses are not the breaking of AES but poor key management: the same key on all cards, a key written in the project documentation, or a factory default key left in production.
- Cloning a fixed number: affects cards without authentication, not DESFire.
- Eavesdropping the conversation: recording the transmission gives neither the key nor the ability to replay the session.
- Real risk: a shared master key, no key rotation, lost cards that were not blocked.
Lengths of card security parameters
How is protection against relay attacks achieved?
A relay attack means two devices pass the conversation between a card in an employee's pocket and a reader at the gate, even when they are tens of metres apart. The card does not know it is being queried from a distance.
DESFire EV3 offers proximity checking: the reader measures the card's response time and rejects the session if the delay points to an intermediary. The function must be enabled in the configuration of both the card and the reader, so when buying, ask your vendor whether the readers support it and whether it is included in the specification.
What does a random UID mean, and why do privacy departments ask about it?
The chip has a 7-byte unique identifier, but it can also work with an optional random identifier. In that mode, each read without authentication returns a different value, so nobody can build from the air, in a corridor or in a car park, a record of who passed where by reading the numbers alone.
This is a privacy feature, not a key mechanism. We discuss how a person is recognised in the system on a separate page about the random UID and its impact on the HR department.
Does the card decide entry, and where does InnerWeb fit in?
An encrypted card confirms the identity of the medium. Whether a given person may enter is decided by the permissions on the system side: valid training, qualifications, a work permit and an active account. That is why, when buying cards, you are not yet buying an access policy.
InnerWeb is a software vendor: we do not produce or resell card readers or cards. We integrate with the access control system you already have and receive card punch events through a webhook, then link them with qualifications, permits and attendance. On the security screen, a card scan or QR badge gives a verdict built from valid training, qualifications for hazardous work, a permit in progress and an active account, and the scan records the entry.
Which questions should you ask the card vendor before signing the order?
A good vendor answers these in writing, without referring you to a general brochure. Failure to answer two or three of the questions below is a sign that the key design has not been worked out.
- Who generates and stores the application master key, and where is its backup kept?
- Are card keys diversified, meaning derived from the master key and the UID of each specific card?
- Do the readers support proximity checking and the random UID in the mode you plan to use?
- What is the procedure for blocking a lost card, and how long does it take to reach all gates?
Checklist
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Frequently asked questions
Is the DESFire EV3 card completely immune to cloning?
The manufacturer describes a high security level and mutual authentication with AES, so simply copying the number does not work. The greatest risk lies in key management, not in the algorithm itself.
Does a random UID prevent recognising an employee in the system?
No. After authentication, the system receives the identifier stored in the card application. The random UID applies only to reads without authentication, so it protects privacy in the surroundings.
Does InnerWeb supply cards and readers?
No. We are a software vendor and integrate with the access control system you already have or will choose, receiving card punch events through a webhook.
Does proximity checking work automatically?
The chip offers the function, but its use depends on the configuration of the card and the reader. Before buying, ask whether it is covered by the specification.
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Let's talk about cards and access events
We will show how events from your access control system feed training, permits and attendance. Book a short call with the InnerWeb team.
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